This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash compensation (including bonuses) and company performance for a sample of large UK companies, focusing in particular on the financial services industry, since incentive misalignment has been blamed as one of the factors causing the global financial crisis of 2007/08. Although we find that pay in the financial services sector is high, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of financial firms is not significantly higher than in other sectors. Consequently, we conclude that it unlikely that incentive structures could be held responsible for inducing bank executives to focus on short-term profits.
The global banking crisis of 2007-08 has been partly blamed on remuneration policies in financial institutions. According to Turner (2009) "There is a strong prima facie case that inappropriate incentive structures played a role in encouraging behaviour which contributed to the financial crisis" (p. 79). In this paper we evaluate this claim by examining the pay-performance relationship of executives in all UK companies, and in financial services companies in particular. 1 We argue that if an emphasis on short-term profits in the banking sector meant that remuneration structures in banks and financial services were to blame for the crisis, we would expect to find evidence that prior to the crisis pay-performance sensitivities were higher in the financial services sector than in other sectors. We show that base pay compensation and bonuses of all UK executives increased substantially over the period 1994-2006, and we provide evidence on the movement in the pay-performance sensitivity over time.,
We find that pay in the financial services sector is high. But, contrary to the prediction that pay was over-sensitive to short-term profits, we find that the pay-performance sensitivity of banks is not significantly higher than in other sectors, and is generally quite low. We therefore question how incentive structures in banks could be blamed for the crisis since there is little evidence that executive compensation in the banking sector depended on short-term financial performance. However, across firms in all sectors we do identify an intriguing asymmetric relationship between pay and performance: when stock returns are high, pay-performance elasticities are also relatively high, but we find that executive pay is less sensitive to performance when stock returns are low. Again, this is a result that we find applies to all firms, not just firms in the financial sector.
A number of recent papers have investigated whether the performance of US banks during the financial crisis was related to executive incentives before the crisis. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) suggest that perverse incentives are dampened if the interests of executives and shareholders are aligned through executives' ownership of company stock. They find no evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were less well aligned with the interests of their shareholders performed worse during the 1 FSA (2009a) suggests that "further research to establish correlations between remuneration practices (good and bad) and performance could be interesting and worthwhile" (Paragraph 3.3) crisis. Conyon, et al (2010) show that the role of compensation in promoting excessive risk taking prior to the crisis was dwarfed by the roles of loose monetary policy, social housing policies, and financial innovation. Adams (2009) documents that the governance of S&P financial firms is no worse than in S&P non-financial firms, and that US banks receiving bailout money had boards that were more independent than in other banks.
What is the evidence from countries other than the US? Beltratti and Stulz (2010) in a cross-country comparison of the performance of banks during the financial crisis, find that it was the fragility of banks' balance sheets, and in particular their reliance on short-term capital market funding, that explained their poor performance. Erkens, Hung and Matos (2009) examine corporate governance policies in 306 financial institutions across 31 countries during the credit crisis. In contrast to the evidence for US banks, they find that financial firms that used CEO compensation contracts with a heavier emphasis on non-equity incentives (bonuses) rather than equity-based compensation) performed worse during the crisis and took more risk before the crisis.
Our paper contributes to this literature by examining the sensitivity of executive compensation to corporate performance in UK financial firms compared to UK nonfinancial firms prior to the financial crisis.
Following on from the Turner Report, UK policy makers have been at the forefront of moves to establish a regulatory framework that ensures the structure of executive remuneration arrangements is appropriate for the risk-management of financial institutions. The Walker Report (2009a , 2009b , in tandem with the UK's regulator in FSA (2009a FSA ( , 2009b , analysed the problems with executive remuneration structures in the financial services sector and recommended a number of changes to compensation practices.
Prior to the credit crisis, the UK's Corporate Governance Code provided requirements on the role of remuneration committees in setting the level and structure of remuneration for executives. The Code enshrined a number of recommendations that arose out of a series of corporate governance reports throughout the nineteen nineties.
These recommendations included: splitting the roles of chairman and chief executive (Cadbury, 1992) , disclosure of executive pay, establishment of remuneration and audit committees, and linking executive incentive pay to clear performance criteria (Greenbury, 1995) , the numbers and responsibilities of non-executive directors on the board (Hampel, 1998) , internal control mechanisms and risk management (Turnbull, 1999) , and independence of non-executives (Higgs, 2003) . practices in financial services, and suggested that an emphasis on short-term profits by institutional investors had encouraged executive remuneration to be focused on "variable compensation" (bonuses) related to the most recent earnings, without any consideration of the exposure to risk-taking. In addition variable compensation schemes tend to be pro-cyclical, since down-side bonuses are capped at zero. These practices were sustained by pressures in the labour market and weak remuneration committees. In response to these perceived market failures, Walker (2009b) recommended a series of changes to remuneration practices: alignment of compensation and its risks made the responsibility of remuneration committees; transparency of the process and levels of executive pay; deferral of incentive payments; and performance criteria related to long-term profitability. These recommendations and eight key principles on executive remuneration identified in FSA (2009b) were enacted in an updated code for UK banks and building societies that became effective from January 2010.
At the international level remuneration policy has been taken forward through two main channels - of the EU, some G20 countries have implemented the FSB Principles on the basis of guidance rather than as enforceable rules. These differences and the lack of a level playing field may cause problems in the future for EU-based banks competing in non-EU markets. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) suggest that there are a range of alternative transmission mechanisms that might explain the misalignment of incentives and the credit crisis.
The version emphasised in FSA (2009a) is that executive pay was too sensitive to short-term profits. But this is a testable relationship which we will examine in this paper. The empirical relationship between executive pay and performance starts from the influential study by Jensen and Murphy (1990) , who first identified the payperformance puzzle: that there is little relationship between these variables. For UK firms, Conyon et al (1995) , Main et al (1996) , Conyon (1997) and Benito and Conyon (1999) confirmed these low pay-performance sensitivities (PPS), with typical elasticities of around 0.15. report that the positive relationship between CEO pay and firm size documented in the U.S. is pervasive across all countries, although the pay-size elasticity is higher in the U.S. than elsewhere. In a comparison of US and UK firms, Conyon and Murphy (2000) found a pay-size relationship of 0.32 for US firms and 0.2 for UK firms.
Murphy (1999) draws a distinction between cash compensation, which includes base salary and annual bonuses (non-equity incentives), and total compensation, which adds in equity incentives such as stock options and LTIPS. The early UK literature related only to cash compensation due to the difficulty of obtaining information on equity incentive based compensation up to 1997, when disclosure rules prompted by Greenbury (1995) came into effect. The inclusion of equity incentive payments (Main et al, 1996; Buck et al, 2003; Ozkan, 2010) increases pay-performance sensitivities. Buck et al (2003) argue that LTIPs should be included in the estimation of pay-performance sensitivities, but recognise that including LTIPs and share options will have a "mechanical relation to performance conditions". Conyon and Murphy (2000, In order to provide further evidence on these trends in Exhibit 1 we have collected data on non-incentive pay and incentive pay (both equity and non-equity) for a subsample of FTSE100 firms in the banking and non-banking sectors from the sample used in this study. In the table we have identified the total compensation for four banks and four comparable non-banks (that are also constituents of the FTSE100
Index with a distribution of total compensation of the board in 2000 that spans the distribution of the four banks). We show the percentage of non-incentive pay (base salary plus other), equity incentive pay (options and LTIPs) and non-equity incentive It is also clear that there are substantial differences in the components of pay within industries. For example Barclays paid out 38.2 per cent of total board pay in the form of bonuses, whereas HSBC put much greater reliance on basic salary at 38.6 per cent.
The numbers in Exhibit 1 suggest that base salary is lower and incentive pay (both equity and non-equity) is higher for our sub-sample than the components identified in Fernandes et al (2010) , and is consistent with their funding that larger firms tend to make greater use of incentive compensation.
In the current paper, we focus on executive pay-performance sensitivity with respect to cash compensation including base salary and non-equity bonuses, and we report below that the growth in this cash compensation for UK directors is well above the level of inflation and wage growth. It is the non-equity incentive payments, which were paid on the basis of past short-term profits, that have been most heavily criticised by regulators (Walker, 2009a (Walker, , 2009b FSA, 2009) , as not being related to long-term profitability.
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There is conflicting evidence as to whether the pay-performance relationship has weakened or strengthened over time. Jensen and Murphy (1990) for the US and Gregg et al (1993) for the UK suggested the pay-performance relationship had weakened; but in contrast Hall and Liebman (1998) and Benito and Conyon (1999) found it had increased. Over time corporate governance practices change, and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) suggest that firms with stronger corporate governance structures tend to have higher pay-performance sensitivities. However in the UK Conyon (1997) , Benito and Conyon (1999) , Girma, Thomson and Wright (2007) and Ozkan (2010) have all found little evidence of various corporate governance changes affecting the level and structure of CEO pay. A contribution of the current paper is to assess the movement in the pay-performance relationship from the mid-nineties onwards.
Jensen and reported little evidence that relative performance to other firms in the same industry acted as a yardstick to managerial incentives. In contrast, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) established that both industry and market relative performance played an important role in shaping executive pay. They found that market performance had a stronger effect than relative industry performance using a large sample of 9,425 firm years over the period 1974 to 1984. Previous UK studies that have explored relative performance evaluation (Main et al, 1996; Benito and Conyon, 1999) found insignificant results.
Argarwal and Samwick (1999) report that the level of firm risk (firm return variance)
is an important determinant of the level of remuneration and that this is robust across other measures of firm risk. Failure to allow for firm risk will under-estimate the true pay-performance relationship. Garen (1994) showed that firms with higher levels of risk (as measured by betas from a regression of firms' return on the market return)
paid their executives more in salary and less in incentive payments. This is consistent with standard principal-agent theory since risk-averse executives should demand higher base salaries and less performance-related pay when risk is high, in order to avoid bearing the firm's idiosyncratic risk. Core and Larcker (1999) , Conyon and Murphy (2000) , and Garvey and Milbourn (2003) have all incorporated some measure of firm risk into models specifying the determination of executive pay.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section I we briefly summarise our methodology for assessing pay-performance sensitivities. Section II describes our dataset, and Section III provides some descriptive statistics and patterns in UK executive compensation over time. Section IV discusses the results of our payperformance estimates, and we provide some concluding comments in Section V.
I Methodology
Following Murphy (1999) we write the pay-performance relationship in log-form so that the pay performance estimates may be interpreted as elasticities:
Where all variables are in logs, and (ExecPAY) it is the measure of executive compensation which will be defined as either the annual total board pay or the annual pay of the highest paid director of firm i in year t;  i refers to an executive/firm specific effect for the executive(s) working in firm i that varies across all Since the sample is a cross section of firms of varying sizes and from different industries there are likely to be time invariant unobserved differences between firms, which may explain some of the variation in pay. Examples of unobserved time invariant effects include director quality, and complexity of the firm. In order to allow for this unobserved heterogeneity, the model will be estimated using fixed effect regressions A fixed effects regression is preferred to a random effects model since the unobserved effects are likely to be correlated with explanatory variables, such as firm size. Since we can not distinguish between unobserved effects and time invariant observed variables, the industry dummies can only be included in a random effects model.
II Data

A Sample
There are two main data sources; Hemscott director trading dataset and Datastream. We excluded investment trust firms, and firms that had less then three years worth of returns/account data and other firms whose data was unavailable from Datastream. 
B Dependent Variables
For each company in the dataset, we collected two measures of directors' compensation from Datastream annual company accounts: the total remuneration of the whole board and the pay of the highest paid director. Total board pay includes the total of all base salaries and bonuses, directors fees, emoluments for management services and pension contributions paid to, or on behalf of directors. Following the introduction of FRS3 (June 1993), compensation for loss of office and ex gratia payments are also included. Pay of the highest paid director represents the highest remuneration paid to any director for the period. Although we would typically expect this to be the company's CEO, a note of caution is that this variable might apply to a different director in a particular year, if for some reason a large payment was made to some other director. Common to other studies we take log values of pay.
C Accounting Years
The 
D Explanatory variables
It has previously been shown that firm size is the most important determinant in the level of executive compensation, and we used total firm assets as a proxy for firm size in the regressions. Previous work has typically used total sales as the measure for firm size, but for the banking sector this variable understates the size of the firm, and therefore we use total assets. Market capitalisation is an alternative measure of firm size, but is likely to be correlated with total shareholder return.
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The most important measure of company performance is the total shareholder return, since the purpose of performance-related pay is to align the interests of the directors with those of the shareholders. We also examined the effect of alternative accounting measures of performance, including earnings per share, return on assets and growth in sales. Although previous UK research has found little evidence of relative performance evaluation, we also included market and industry adjusted returns.
We computed total shareholder return as an annual value by accounting year, as distinct from calendar year, in order to align the performance variables with the relevant accounting variables. We calculated annual returns for each company by cumulating the standard daily return, defined as the percentage change in close-toclose share price plus the dividend payment on the ex-dividend date. Main et al (1996) , and Conyon (1997) calculated annual returns by the log of the change in the return index over the whole year. Instead we follow Barber and Lyon (1997) and compute annual abnormal returns as the buy and hold return (BHAR) minus the buy and hold return on a reference portfolio.
The BHAR approach cumulates daily returns on an annual basis to give total shareholder return for the relevant accounting year. Market and industry adjusted returns are calculated as the actual return minus the expected return. Expected returns are estimated using a CAPM model, which runs a regression of the firm's daily return on that of the daily market return:
The parameters from this regression ( ) ,
can be used to calculate expected returns
where RFTAll is the actual daily return on the FT All Share market index. To obtain the parameter estimates we ran regressions on the daily returns for the year prior to the accounting year. This results in approximately 255 observations in each regression. For the first accounting year, we used in-sample estimates of the coefficients. In the case where firms had changed their accounting years, we estimated the parameters over the full year prior to the new accounting year.
The same method is used to obtain expected returns for the industry adjusted returns except regressions are run using the return on the industry index to which the firm belongs. Industry groups are defined in Appendix 3. Core and Larcker (1999) suggests that different corporate governance arrangements in firms may influence how much they pay their executives. Fernandes et al (2010) report that CEO pay is positively related to institutional ownership, board size, and fraction of independent directors. We include two measures of board structure: the total number of directors, and the proportion of the non-executives on the board as a measure of independence. Firms that have more directors (particularly more executive directors) may pay their whole board more simply because they have more directors to pay. A firm may increase total board pay in one year because there are additions to the board rather then any pay increases to the existing members, and we need to control for this effect. A larger board size may also suggest the firm is more complex, and hence the need for more (higher quality) directors, who will demand more pay.
Non-executive directors only receive fees for their services, and are paid considerably less than the executive directors on the board. If there were a greater proportion of non-executives one would expect the total board pay to be less (given board size is kept constant). In addition more non-executives may result in the executive directors being paid less due to greater monitoring. Greenbury (1995) recommended that remuneration committees should comprise solely of non-executive directors. An increase in the proportion of non-executives may reflect this fact and therefore since the non-executives are setting the level of executive pay, pay may be lower.
It is difficult to predict the effect board size and composition would have on the pay of the highest paid director. If there are more directors on the board then the highest paid director may have more responsibility in running a larger and possibly more complex board/firm. On the other hand there may be more executives to take on the major roles so that the highest paid director has less responsibility and therefore require lower remuneration since all executives in the firm receive similar pay.
Cadbury (1992) recommended that roles should be distributed among executives so no one individual has all the power. Again, a higher proportion of non-executive directors may imply greater monitoring so the executive directors' pay is set at a lower rate. Alternatively if there are few other executive directors, the highest paid director may have more roles and responsibility and actually require higher remuneration.
We include a series of time dummies to allow for macroeconomic shocks, and a variable for each industry group was created. Conyon and Murphy (2000) used only four categories of industry group: mining and manufacturers, utilities, financial services and other. In the Hemscott dataset industry groups are defined by the ten FTSE Actuaries industry sectors listed in Appendix 3. As can be seen from Appendix 3, most firms in the sample are in the cyclical service group, which makes up almost a third of all observations. The least populated sector with only six firms is cyclical consumer goods. The financial sector has 59 firms spanning banks, insurance companies, real estate, and speciality finance firms.
Since the dataset is constituted as a panel over several years, the effects of inflation on the monetary variables needs to be allowed for. All nominal variables were adjusted to 2006 values by using the monthly retail price index RPIX, excluding mortgage payments.
III Overview of Directors Remuneration: Descriptive Statistics
Our sample of 415 firms is an unbalanced panel in that some firms leave the sample before the end and others join midway through. The maximum number of firm-year observations is 4,044 but there may be missing observations for some variables.
Panel C in Appendix 2 shows the distribution of the number of observations per firm year. Forty percent of firms (167) are in the sample for the full time-series of 12 years, with only about 10% of firms having less than 6 years worth of data. There were 14 firms that had a fiscal year missing due to a change in account year-ends. There were 18 firms that had an account year that was greater than 12 months and this data had been annualised by Datastream and their returns in our sample were also adjusted. Table 1 Panel A gives a summary of the pay variables in real terms. The mean of both the total board pay and that of the highest paid director is much greater than the median, suggesting that both pay variables are right skewed with a few firms having unusually large values.
The large standard deviations for both pay variables demonstrates there is a wide spread of pay levels across time and between firms in our sample. Both pay variables are higher in the financial firms than in non-financial firms. Figures 1 and 2 plot the levels of average real total board pay and real pay of the highest paid director across the sample period. These figures show these averages across all industries, and for the financial services sector in particular.
[INSERT The mean total board real pay has risen by 63% and there has been a 50% rise in the median real pay, and the mean-median ratio has increased from 1.28 to 1.39. A gap between the median and the mean is likely to be a natural feature of directors pay. There is likely to be a base level of pay necessary to induce participation, and high variance and non-negative rewards for performance and managing large firms, creating a long tail of unusually high pay. The fact that the mean is rising faster than the median suggests this tail is getting longer, with pay for those very highly paid individuals or high reward periods rising faster than that for basic salaries (we will return to this point later). slightly. The average pay of the highest paid director has been growing at a faster rate then that of the total board pay. This is reflected in the increase in the ratio of the highest paid director pay to the pay of the total board. In the 1994/95 fiscal year this ratio averaged 24% but by 2005/06 it had risen to 33%. As in Figure 1 , it appears that the real pay of the highest paid director in the financial services sector is volatile, and appears to lead executives' pay in other sectors.
Not only are executives getting pay rises well above inflation levels but these are much greater then those of the typical employee in their firm. In our sample on average the average director in a firm earns 12 times more then an average employee in that firm and this ratio has been rising over the sample period (in 1994/95 it was around 9 times and by 2005/06 it was 15 times). Whilst over the sample the mean board pay has risen by 63% and the highest paid director by 122% the average employee costs has only risen by 11.72% in real terms 4 .
[ executive pay has risen much faster than that of managers and senior officials and more then double that of all employees in the UK. The evidence we are documenting is that executive cash compensation has grown considerably during our sample period and by more then any comparable group.
[INSERT EXHIBIT 3 ABOUT HERE]
Exhibit 3 shows the distribution of the average real total board pay and the average pay of the highest paid director by ten industry sectors. These sectors are defined in Appendix 3. It can be seen that total board pay is highest in the non-cyclical services sector which includes food and drug retailers, and telecommunications. The financial services sector which includes banks, insurance companies, real estate and financial specialist companies have the second largest total board pay at £3.545 million, and the highest paid single director at £915,900.
[ The change in both pay variables appears to follow that of the market index with a slight lag. This may reflect that the largest component of cash compensation, salary, is set at the beginning of the accounting year. Some of the growth in pay over the period may therefore be attributed to the growth in the stock market. This large pay growth over the sample period we have documented may be attributed to the fact that between the 1996 and 1999 fiscal years the stock market grew by 58%. We will explore these issues in more detail in the regression results in Section V below.
[
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The trend to having a majority of non-executive directors on the board is illustrated in figure 4 and Table 1 In the fiscal year of 2005/06 on average 57.1% of board members were nonexecutives compared to 51.6% in FTSE 250 companies. The boards of financial firms have more members than non-financial firms (Walker, 2009) , although the mix between executive and non-executives is the same for all firms.
These changes in board composition reflect the impact of the corporate governance reports (Cadbury,1992; Greenbury. 1995) , which highlighted the importance of, and recommended increases in, the numbers of non-executive board members. Hampel (1998) recommended that the board should comprise at least a third of nonexecutives, and Higgs (2003) recommended that at least half the board should be nonexecutives. From the above evidence it appears this is already the case, particularly in the FTSE 100 companies. Since the average board size has not changed, the evidence in figure 4 suggests that firms have increased the number of non-executives at the expense of executive directors. This would suggest that the total board pay should have decreased slightly since non-executives are typically paid much less than executive directors. Since total board pay has in fact risen, the increase in executiveonly pay is likely to have been underestimated since executives must be receiving a larger slice of total board pay.. Table 1 
IV Regression Results
A list and description of the variables used in our regressions can be found in Appendix 1. All regressions were performed on both the log of pay of the whole board and that of the highest paid director. First, the firm's raw return is included as the company performance explanatory variable with the inclusion of adjusted return measures later. Following the approach in Murphy (1999) stock market performance variables were entered in the model in the form ln(1+return), and total assets were included in log form to reduce the effect of outliers in firm size. Therefore our pay performance estimates are interpreted as elasticities, which is common to the majority of prior studies. In all the regressions the control variables of total assets, number of directors and proportion of non-executives are used. Year dummies are included to allow for any aggregate effects that are not constant over time such as macroeconomic shocks. Model 1 for both the total board pay in Table 2 and for the highest paid director in Table 3 estimates a pooled regression across firms and time. Industry dummies were included to allow for any possibility of differences across industries, but the only sectors that displayed any significant effects were the Resources, Cyclical
Consumer Goods, Utilities and Financial sectors, and the reported regression results only highlight sector dummy variables for these industries. Given the high levels of executive pay in Exhibit 3, surprisingly the coefficients on the financial sector dummies are negative. The interpretation is that financials pay their board 23% less, and their highest paid director 25% less than other industries, after conditioning on the other variables in the regression. These industry dummies show that the high level of pay in the financial sector can be explained by the other variables in Model 2, and in particular is due to the large size of companies in the financial services sector as measured by the total assets of the firm: large firms pay high levels of remuneration to their executives. In fact these results suggest that executives in the financial services sector are underpaid relative to the size of their firm's assets.
[ INSERT TABLE 2 and TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
A Fixed effects regressions
Model 2 reports the fixed effects estimates for the total board pay shown in Table 2 and those for the highest paid director in Table 3 . An F-test on the significance of the fixed effects that all γ i =0 is easily rejected for both dependent variables. We also compare the fixed effects regression model with a random effects model and for both sets of regressions a Hausman 4 test rejects consistent random effects i.e. the unobserved effects are correlated with the explanatory variables so the random effect results will be biased Therefore in interpreting the main regression analysis for both dependent variables we will draw on the fixed effects models.
Firm size has a much larger effect on pay than firm return. In the fixed effects model the total assets' elasticity is around 0.22 for both pay variables implying that a 10% increase in total assets will lead to a 2% increase in pay: so larger firms pay their boards/top director considerably more. In contrast, shareholder return has a much smaller effect on executive pay. The shareholder return elasticity is slightly stronger for the pay of the highest paid director. The coefficients in Model 2 of Tables 2 and 3 , suggest that a 10% increase in shareholder return will lead to a 0.38% increase in total board pay and a 0.68% increase in the pay of the highest paid director. A 10% increase in total assets and total shareholder return translates into a £41,866 and £7.027 increase in total board pay respectively at the median level of total board pay of £1,864,005. In the case of the pay of the highest paid director a 10% increase in total assets and total shareholder return translates into a £11.815 and a £3,726 increase in highest paid director pay at the median level of £543,200. Clearly executive pay is more sensitive to firm size than firm performance. The shareholder return estimates for the highest paid director are comparable to Conyon (1997) and Benito and Conyon (1999) , but lower than Conyon and Murphy (2000) . Our estimates for total board pay are lower than Main et al (1996) , who produced estimates of around of 0.15 but this may reflect that their study only used a cross section of 60 large FTSE 100 firms.
The coefficients for the time dummies in the basic fixed effects regression, although not reported in Tables 2 and 3 [
INSERT EXHIBIT 4 ABOUT HERE]
The time variables will be picking up any factors that change over time but are the same across all firms. Even after allowing for firm size and firm performance the growth in average total board pay has grown by 63% and that of the highest paid director has grown by 122%. This highlights that much of the growth in directors' pay can not be attributed to the individual firms' performance, and suggests that corporate governance reports that have emphasised aligning executive pay with performance, have been ineffective.
In Model 3 to focus on the pay-performance relationship in the financial services sector we interacted a financial sector dummy with the performance measure, ln(1+firm return) to see whether pay-performance sensitivity differed between the finance sector and all other industries. We anticipated finding that pay-performance would be more sensitive in the financial sector than other industries. However in the financial services sector, for the two measures of executive pay, although payperformance elasticities are higher than in the remaining industries, these differences are not statistically significant. In unreported results we also investigated the payperformance sensitivity across the other sectors, and identified substantial variation across sectors. In the case of the real pay of the highest paid director, payperformance is significantly higher at the 1 per cent level for the Cyclical Consumer Goods sector.
As might be expected the number of directors on the board, also reflecting firm size, has a positive effect on the total board pay since there are more (and possibly higher quality) directors to pay. From the coefficients in Model 2 of Table 2 , an increase in the board size by one director will increase total board pay by 5.8%. From Table 3 , the number of directors has a positive but insignificant effect on the pay of the highest paid director.
The proportion of non-executive directors has opposite effects on the total board pay and the highest paid director pay, though for the latter it is insignificant for the fixed effects models. As the proportion of non-executive directors increases the total pay of the board goes down. From Table 2 a 1% increase in the proportion of nonexecutives will reduce total board pay by 0.58%. This may be simply because nonexecutives are paid less since they only receive directors' fees so if there are a higher number of non-executives then overall pay will be less (holding board size constant).
On the other hand, the proportion of non-executives may be a proxy for the level of monitoring exerted by the board, so more monitoring (more non-executives) will lower total board pay. If this was the case, we might expect the proportion of nonexecutives to have a negative effect on the pay of the highest paid director. In Table   3 , the effect is positive although insignificant. These results suggest that the size of the board and the composition of the board do not affect the level of pay for the highest paid director but do affect the pay of the whole board.
We now turn to the effect of firm risk on the pay-performance relationship. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Garvey and Milbourn (2003) found that riskier firms tend to have lower pay-performance relationships and a smaller proportion of their pay as incentive based pay. Since we have only data on cash compensation we can't directly test the latter but we can look at the former. The firm return was interacted with the cumulative density function of the firm's variance of returns, as our measure of firm risk. For each firm, the variance of daily returns for the previous account year was computed, except in the case of the first year where that years data was used. These variances were then normalised using a cumulative density function (CDF). This enabled each firm to have a value between 0 and 1 so the firm with the most risk would have a CDF equal to 1.
The coefficients on firm return and firm return interacted with the CDF are shown in This demonstrates that firms with a higher level of risk tend to have lower pay performance relationships, as has been found previously.
A potential endogeneity problem is that pay induces effort and increased effort produces better performance, leading to overstated performance-pay coefficients. To correct for this endogeneity we also estimate the model using GMM. In Model 6 the performance coefficient of the board pay regression remains similar at 0.0374, but the effect of total assets is reduced from 0.2246 to 0.1234, but this may reflect that lagged total board pay is included in the regression and total assets in the other regressions 5 Including an interaction of firm risk and performance has a high correlation with the performance variable of 0.94, but the other coefficients are stable with respect to the inclusion of this variable will be picking up the persistence of pay. As would be expected the GMM regression shows that there is some persistence in pay. The GMM regression coefficient in Model 6 on firm return is very similar to that from the fixed effects regression. In both Tables 2 and 3 the Hansen test rejects the null of invalid instruments for the GMM models.
.
B Alternative measures of returns 6
We have seen that the raw firm return does have an effect on directors' pay. But firms may be showing notable performance because the whole market/industry is performing well. Therefore Model 5 in Tables 2 and 3 reports the use of market adjusted returns, in which a CAPM estimate of expected returns is deducted from the raw return. If the market/industry is rising, do firms take this into account before setting pay levels? Is executive compensation related to the out-performance of the firm relative to the market or industry? For both pay variables it seems that market adjusted returns makes very little difference to the significance, sign and size of the return coefficients. In unreported results we found that industry adjusted return has a slightly larger effect but only makes a marginal difference. In comparison with the earlier reported numbers, a 10% increase in total return above the market return from
Model 5 increases total board pay by £6,766. Using similar information from Table 3, if return is greater then the market by 10%, the median highest paid director pay will increase by £3,634. These estimates would suggest that firms do not make use of relative performance evaluation.
C Heterogeneous results
Our fixed effects estimates in Tables 2 and 3 [INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] Figure 5 shows how the pay-performance relationship has changed over the sample period plotting the estimates of the coefficients on the interactive dummy variables.
Following proposals from a series of corporate governance reports suggesting stronger links between pay and performance, one might have expected that the payperformance relationship would have increased over the period. Over the whole sample it is possible to discern a slight rising trend in the pay-performance elasticities for both pay variables, although the time series movement is volatile. For the total board it has risen from 0.02 in 1995 to 0.106 in 2006 and for the highest paid director it has risen from 0.034 to 0.288. There appears to be a pattern that elasticities are increasing when the stock market is rising, but a weaker relationship between pay and performance when stock prices are falling. F-tests on the differences in these payperformance elasticities were F(11, 3205)=0.78, and F(11, 3201)=1.10 for total pay and highest paid director respectively, and hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all of these coefficients are equal.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
We may also examine how the pay size relationship has changed over time.
Interactive dummy variables of sales and year dummies were included in the regression. Figure 6 shows the pay size elasticities over the sample period. The pay size relationship has fluctuated around a mean of about 0.22 for both pay variables. In the 1994/95 fiscal year the pay size elasticity was 0.228 and 0.208 for total pay and that of the highest paid director respectively. By 2005/06 they had risen to 0.234 and 0.241 respectively. F-tests for the equality of the pay-size elasticities coefficients are F(11, 3205)=1.54 for the total board pay and F(11, 3201)=1.21 for the pay of the highest paid director. This evidence suggests that there is no significant trend over time for the pay-size sensitivity for either pay measure. Murphy (1999) reports that the pay size relationship had fallen for executive compensation in the US.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
We also examined how the pay-performance relationship varied across different categories. For variables that varied across time, interactive variables were included in the basic fixed effect regressions, and Table 4 shows the effect of these interactive time dummies. If directors are rewarded through a combination of base pay which is unrelated to performance plus performance related bonuses which can only be positive then you will naturally see pay being sensitive to exceptionally good performance but not exceptionally bad performance. This pattern will lead to pooled estimates we have estimated above to somewhat mask the full extent of rewards to exceptionally good performance. On the other hand such one-sided risks can lead to high risk taking as poor performance is not punished to the same degree as good performance is rewarded. There was some suggestion of this in figure 3 . This was tested by interacting the firm return variable with whether firms were below or above the median return of the sample firms in each fiscal year. For both pay variables there does seem to be a difference between firms below and above median firm return. The pay-performance relationship is significant for firms above median return but insignificant for those below. For firms above the median return the average payperformance relationship is 0.0465 for the total board pay and 0.0968 for the highest paid director. These estimates are higher then the average pay-performance relationships found in the original fixed effect regressions. Although not reported results were similar when the return was interacted with whether firms are above or below the return on the FTSE All Share index in the given fiscal year. We also differentiated between the financial services sector and all other sectors, and it appears that this difference between pay-performance elasticities for above the median and below the median firms are more pronounced for firms in the financial services sector.
However an F-test on the equality of these coefficients could not be rejected.
Next, the firm return was interacted with whether the fiscal year was during the bull market up to March 2000, the subsequent bear market up to 2003, and the bull market since 2004. The pay-performance relationship was stronger for both pay variables during the bear market fall. This suggests that firms were receiving pay based on the performance of the whole market when the market was booming, and then based on their own performance after the stock market crashed. An alternative explanation would be that firms are under more pressure to comply with the corporate governance reports when the stock market is in decline.
The third set of interactive variables look at the size of firms, split into whether the firms were above or below median total assets in the particular fiscal year. There appears to be a stronger pay-performance relationship for larger firms than smaller firms. However this is not the case for firms in the financial services sector, where the pay-performance relationship for total board pay is stronger for firms below median assets.
V Conclusions
The objective of this paper has been to examine the determinants of executive pay, how this relationship has changed over time, and whether there is any evidence that executive remuneration packages in the financial services sector might have contributed to the global financial crisis of 2007/08. We argued that if remuneration structures in financial firms were responsible for the crisis, then the pay-performance relationship between executive pay and short-term profits should have been greater than in other sectors. Our pay measures comprised salary and non-equity bonuses.
According to Fernandes et al (2010) these components typically constitute around seventy per cent of UK executives' pay packages. Still, a caveat to our results is that our pay variables did not include equity incentive payments. , Following the financial crisis, regulators have been searching to identify an appropriate regulatory structure to monitor non-equity incentives as a component of executive pay. For example, Recommendation 33 of the Walker Report (2009a) proposes that half of the value of incentive payments to executives should only be vested after between three and five years.
Our main findings are that firm size has a dominant influence on the level of executive compensation. Surprisingly we found that although total board pay and the pay of the highest paid director was relatively high in the financial sector, there was no significant difference in the pay-performance sensitivities between the financial sector and other industries. Further, although the pay-performance point estimates are slightly larger in the finance sector, the values are so small as to make it unlikely that executives in the finance sector were over-incentivised. The primary factor related to executive pay appears to be firm size. It has been argued that remuneration packages in the financial services sector may have been partly responsible for the global financial crisis. It would appear that the mechanism for such an impact is not through the relationship between executive pay and stock market performance, but instead through the incentive for executives to ensure that their firm's assets are as large as possible. Of course it could be argued that the experience of the financial crisis has shown that banks in particular are so important to the functioning of the global economy, that compensation packages should be less sensitive to performance than for non-financial firms.
Following the adoption of a series of corporate governance reforms throughout the 'nineties we expected to find an increase in these pay-performance elasticities over time, since a common theme in these reforms was that executive pay should be related to company performance. However we found little evidence of any upward trend in pay-performance sensitivities, but we did identify an asymmetric relationship, in that pay-performance elasticities were high when stock returns were high, but that pay was less sensitive to performance when stock returns were low. This follows if executives are paid a base salary unrelated to performance, plus bonuses, which are related to above average performance and can only be positive. This one sided risk model creates an asymmetry in the pay-performance link which might potentially encourage excessive risk taking by executives in all sectors. Our results suggest that there is a stronger relationship between executive cash pay and company performance for exceptional out-performance but not unusual under-performance. A final limitation to these findings, is that there may be other penalties for underperformance that we have not considered, such as turnover and loss of reputation in the managerial labour market (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2010) . Real total board pay and pay of highest paid director by ten broad industry groups. 
